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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
Case Nos. 18235 and 18236 
vs. 
ROBERT JORDAN, JR. and 
TERRY FULLMER 
---0000000---
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
---0000000---
APDITIONAL STATEMENT ON APPEAL 
Since the filing by Appellants of their original brief in 
this matter, the United States Supreme Court has made a major 
ruling affecting, to some degree, the issues involved in the 
matter at hand. In addition to other cases relied on by 
Appellants in their original brief, we cited the New York Case of 
.E.e.QQ.l e v s • F e.I..btl , s 2 N. Y • 2 a 6 7 4 , 4 3 9 N. Y. s. 2 a 8 6 3 ( N. Y. 1 9 81 ) an a 
other similar cases in which "child pornography laws" were struck 
down by various courts as being overbroad. As has been referred 
to at some length by Respondents, People ys. Ferber, was recently 
reversed by the United States Supreme Court in 
N..e.l:l_YQil ys. Fe.t:~, _u.s._, 31 Cr.L.R. 3139 (1982). It is to 
further examine the ~w York ys. Ferber opinion, and answer other 
contentions made by Respondent, that Appellants file this reply 
brief. 
1 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASE OF ~ I..QEK ~ 
f~~E DOES NOT AFFECT THE ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANTS THAT THE 
STATUTE AT ISSUE IS INVALID ON ITS FACT AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH. 
The case of New York ys. Ferber. supra: 
arose when Paul Ferber, the proprietor of a 
Manhattan bookstore specializing in sex-
ually oriented products, sold two films to an 
undercover police officer. The films are 
devoted almost exclusviely to depicting young 
boys masturbating. Ferber was indicted on 
two counts of section 263.10 and two counts 
of section 263.15, the two New York laws 
controlling dissemination of child 
pornography. After a jury trial, Ferber was 
acquitted of the two counts of promoting an 
obscene sexual performance, but found guilty 
of the two counts under 263.15, which did 
not require proof that the films were ob-
scene. 31 Cr.L. at 3140. 
Mr. Fe£ber appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division of 
the New York State supreme Court, which affirmed (72 A.D.2d 558, 
424 N.Y.S.2d, 967) and then to the New York Court of Appeals, 
which reversed, holding that section 263.15 violated the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The New York 
Statute at issue provides: 
A Person is guilty of promoting a sexual 
performance by a child when, knowing the 
character and content thereof, he produces, 
directs or promotes any performance which 
includes sexual conduct by a child less than 
sixteen years of age. 
The New York Court of Appeals found the statute unconstit-
utionally overbroad "because it prohibited the distribution of 
2 
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materials produced outside the state, as well as materials, such 
as medical books and educational sources, which 'deal with 
adolescent sex in a realistic but non-obscene manner.'" 52 N.Y.2d 
681. The United States Supreme Court granted the State's 
Petition for Certiorari for the purpose of presenting the single 
question: 
To prevent the abuse of children who are made 
to engage in sexual conduct for commercial 
purposes, could the New York State Legisla-
ture, consistent with the First Amendment, 
prohibit the dissemination of material which 
shows children engaged in sexual conduct, 
regardless of whether such material is ob-
scene? 31 Cr.L. at 3141. 
In answering the question, the Court first sets out the line 
of cases previously discussed in Appellants' original brief in 
which the Court has held that "obscenity is not within the area 
of constitutionally protected speech or press." Roth vs. United 
S~.a.t.g~, 354 US 476 at 485 (1957). The M.i.li~ standard the cur-
rent standard by which allegedly pornographic materials are 
judged, is discussed, and then the Court makes the following 
observation: 
Like obscenity statutes, laws directed at the 
dissemination of child pornography run the 
risk of suppressing protected expression by 
allowing the hand of the censor to become 
unduly heavy. For the following reasons, 
however, we are persuaded that the states are 
entitled to greater leeway in the regulation 
of pornographic depictions of children. 31 
Cr.L. at 3142. 
The Court, in presenting the question for decision, and in making 
3 
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the comment referred to above, uses the terms "sexual conduct" 
and "child pornography." The Court then finds that: 
The prevention of sexual exploitation and 
abuse of child constitutes a government obje-
ctive of surpassing importance •••• The 
legislative judgment, as well as the judgment 
found in the relevant literature, is that the 
use of children as subjects of pornographic 
materials is harmful to physiological, emo-
tional, and mental health of the child. 31 
Cr.L. at 3142 
The Court then goes on to find that allowing the dissemination of 
such "pornographic materials" involving the depiction of "sexual 
activity by juveniles" contributes to the harm described above. 
The Court explains why the use of the Mii~ standard is not 
satisfactory in this situation: 
Thus, the question under the ll.i..l.l.~ test of 
whether a work, taken as a whole, appeals to 
the prurient interest of the average person 
bears no connection to the issue of whether a 
child has been physically or psychologically 
harmed in the production of the work. Simil-
arly, a sexually explicit depiction need not 
be "patently offensive" in order to have 
required the sexual exploitation of a child 
for its production. In addition, a work 
which, taken on the whole, contains serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value may nevertheless embody the hardest 
core of child pornography. 31 Cr.L. at 3143 
Further, the Court states: 
The value of permitting live performances and 
photographic reproductions of children en-
gaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly 
modest, if not .Q~_mi.n.imis. We consider it 
unlikely that visual depictions of chilaren 
performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting 
their aenitals would often constitute an 
irnport~nt and necessary part of a literary 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
performance or scientific or educational 
work. As the trial court in this case obser-
ved, if it were necessary for literary or 
artistic value, a person over the statutory 
age who perhaps looked younger could be uti-
lized. Simulation outside of the prohibition 
of the statute could provide another 
alternative. 31 Cr.L. at 3143. 
In deciding that the states are to be given more leeway 
handling the problems of child pornography than in handling otl 
allegedly "obscene" materials, produced by and aimed at adul 
the .r.e.I .. QjU:. Court still sets some stiff standards: 
There are, of course, limits on the category 
of child pornography which, like obscenity, 
is unprotected by the First Amendment. As 
with all legislation in this sensitive area, 
the conduct to be prohibited must be adequa-
tely defined by the applicable state law, as 
written or authoritatively construed. Here 
the nature of the harm to be cornbatted re-
quires that the state offense be limited to 
works that visually depict sexual conduct by 
children below a specified age. The category 
of 'sexual conduct' proscribed must also be 
suitably limited and described. 
The test for child pornography is separate 
from the obscenity standard enunciated in 
.Mill.e..t:, bu t may be c om pa r e d to i t f or p u r pose 
of clarity. The Miller formulation is adju-
sted in the following respects: A trier of 
fact need not find that the material appeals 
to the prurient interest of the average per-
son; it is not required that sexual conduct 
portrayed be done so in a patently offensive 
manner: and the material at issue need not be 
considered as a whole. We note that the 
distribution of descriptions or other depic-
tions of sexual conduct, not otherwise ob-
scene, which do not involve live performance 
or photographic or other visual reproduction 
of live performances, retains First Amendment 
protection. As with obscenity laws, cri~inal 
responsibility may not be imposed without 
5 
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some element of scienter on the part of the 
defendant. (citations omitted) 31 Cr.L. at 
3144. 
Further, the Ferber Court observes that, in section 263.15: 
The forbidden acts to be depicted are listed 
with sufficient precision and represent the 
kind of conduct that, if it were the theme of 
a work, could render it legally obscene: 
'actual or siraulated sexual intercourse, 
deviant sexual intercourse, sexual bestial-
ity, masturbation, sadomascastic abuse, and, 
or lewd exhibition of the genitals. Section 
263.3. The term "lewd exhibition of the 
genitals" is not unknown in this area 
and, indeed, was given in M.ill~~ as an 
example of a permissible regulation. 413 
U.S., at 25 •• 
We hold that section 263.15 sufficiently 
describes a category of material the 
production and distribution of which is not 
entitled to first amendment protection. It is 
therefore clear that there is nothing 
unconstitutionally 'underinclusive' about a 
statute that singles out this catagory of 
material for proser iption. 31 Cr.L. at 3144. 
The court, at the end of the last statement cited, inserts a 
footnote that is of extreme importance to the case at issue here: 
.E..t.Z.ll..QZn.i.k_y_._,Cil;i._.Q.L.J._g c k.§..Q.ll.Y.i.l~ 4 2 2 U. S. 
205 (1975), relied upon by the Court of Ap-
peals, struck down a law against drive-in 
theaters showing nude scenes if movies could 
be seen from a public place. Since nudity, 
without more is protected expression, id., at 
213, we proceeded to consider the 
underinclusiveness of the ordinance. The 
Jacksonville ordinance impermissably singled 
out movies with nudity for special treatment 
while failing to regulate other protected 
speech which created the same alleged risk to 
traffic. Today, we hold that child 
pornography as defined in section 263.15 is 
unprotected speech subject to content-based 
regulation. Hence, it cannot be underinclus-
6 
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ive or unconstitutional for a State to do 
precisely that. (Footnote) 31 Cr.L. at 3144. 
A review of the statements made by the Supreme Court in 
deciding the .f~~b~I matter easily refutes the contentions of 
Respondent in Point I and III of its brief. Respondent argues 
th a t the .£..e~b.eI case means th a t "the r e a r e no s p e e ch or exp res-
sion issues involved in the act of sexual exploitation of a 
minor" (Respondent's brief page 6) and that "the Appellants have 
no standing to raise first amendment arguments." (id.) Again on 
page 10 of respondent's brief is the statement: 
There are, however, no speech or expression 
activities involved in employing, using, 
persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a 
minor to pose in the nude for the purpose of 
sexual arousal or for profit, or ~o engage in 
sexual or simulated sexual conduct anymore 
than there are speech or expression 
activities involved in rape, robbery, or 
murder. 
In fact, the Supreme Court in the .f..e.t..btl matter, says exactly 
the opposite. The court clearly describes the production and 
dissemination of child pornography as "unprotected speech" (31 
Cr.L. at 3144). The court recognizes (id.) that legislation in 
this area is still within the "sensitive area" of first amendment 
regulation. Because of that fact, the court puts clear "limits" 
on such legislation. The most notable limit is that the material 
must involve "sexual conduct" and it appears that the conduct 
must be the kind of conduct "that, if it were the theme of a 
work, could render it legally obscene" (id.). In fact, the court 
7 
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most clearly excludes nudity (without more) stating that such 
nudity is "protected expressionq (id.). Thus, the opinion of the 
United State Supreme Court in ~li ~~~k y £~~~ reinforces the 
arguments of appellants in their original brief, and does not 
take the conduct of the appellants out of the first amendment 
area, as stated by respondents. Appellants have argued, and 
continue to argue, that the inclusion of nudity as proscribed 
conduct renders the statute here hopelessly overbroad. The con-
duct proscribed by section 76-10-1206.5 goes well beyond the 
sexual activity of the kind that could render it legally obscene. 
In fact, counsel for appellants has observed numerous violations 
of the statute on public television and in popular movies shown 
in Ut~h, since the filing of the original brief. The makers of 
"Buggies" and "Luvs" diapers regularly show females under the age 
of 18 with exposed breasts in their television commercials (or at 
least they appear to be females with the names "Michelle", 
"Katy", "Maggie", and "Sarah"). The movie ~.a .S...e.~, shown on 
Channel 20 (KSTU Television, Salt Lake City) on September 10, 
1982, showed a baby, completely naked from the rear, while being 
bath ed. The rnov i e SJ.U2..e.LID..9..Il .Il., shown at many theaters in Utah, 
showed a very young boy completely naked, from a frontal view, at 
the beginning of the movie. such examples continue to abound, 
and are clear violations of the statute, as worded. It is as-
sumed, of course, that very few people involved in the production 
and distribution of such films and commercials were sexually 
8 
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aroused in the process. Perhaps, however, a trial would be 
necessary to prove or disprove that assumption. It is equally 
clear, of course, that the production and distribution of the 
f ilrns and commercials were done for profit. Respondent scoffs at 
the mention of such examples by appellants as a "parade of hor-
ribles" and states that appellants have no standing to raise such 
examples (respondent's brief page 13). Appellants admit that it 
is highly unlikely that these corporate law violators will ever 
be brought to answer for their conduct. In fact, it appears that 
the alleged misconduct of appellants was brought to the attention 
of the authorities by a frustrated narcotics investigator who had 
sought unsuccessfully to obtain evidence against appellants in 
other crimes (R. 4). Certainly the "parade of horribles," cited 
by respondent, of the spectre of reputable businessmen being 
arrested for violation of this statute will never occur. Perhaps 
it will only be used against those who already have incurred the 
wrath of the authorities for living supposedly "deviant" life 
styles. It is just that highly questionable use of the enforce-
rnent apparatus which appellants protest. 
POINT II 
AS APPLIED TO THESE APPELLANTS, THE STATUTE IS BOTH UNCONSTITU-
TIONl1LLY VAGUE AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD. 
Respondent, in Point II of its brief, contends that even if 
the statute at issue here is overbroad as to some potential 
defendants, it is not as applied to these defendants, and 
9 
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appellants therefore have no standing to assert the rights of 
others in this action. As already indicated in Point I of this 
Reply Brief, the recent decision in ~H X.Q.t.k y ~~~L destroys 
the argument of Respondent that we are dealing in an area out-
side traditional forms of speech, and outside the protections of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution. In fact, the guidelines given by the Supreme Court in 
that case show that the State of Utah went too far in its prose-
cution of these Defendants, and the law is indeed overbroad as 
applied to these Defendants. In the Information the Defendants 
are charged with having: 
••• used, persuaded, induced, or enticed 
Holly Wilkerson, a minor, .t.Q 12.Qil .in .the 
filH~~ •••• (emphasis added) (R. 2). 
In fact, it is clear from the record that the claim of nudity was 
an important part of the state's case. At pre-trial hearings, 
the State's counsel argued long and hard that "this is not a 
pornography case" (R. 109). In referring to the statute, counsel 
for Plaintiff stated "all it says is that 2-Q.Y can't ~~~ n~ 
Qig tu_t:._e~ of a min or engaging in simulated sexual conduct" 
(emphasis added) (R. 110). Again, at the end of the State's case 
in chief, during arguments on Defendants' motions to dismiss, 
there occurred this exchange between the Court and the 
prosecutor: 
THE COURT: Not used in the Information. All 
right. I think your word is 'used,' used 'a 
minor.' And then you go, 'to pose in the 
10 
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nude -- ' No, used her to engage in 'simul-
ated sexual conduct for the purpose of photo-
graphing. ' 
MR. WATSON: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, that in a nutshell, is what 
you are claiming, is that so? 
MR. WATSON: And, 'in the nude.' (R. 153). 
In his summation, the prosecutor stated "the evidence is clear 
that both of these defendants used the person of Holly Wilkerson 
~~ ~ i.n .t.h..e. Il.Y~ while simulating sexual conduct (emphasis 
added) (R. 169). 
In support of its case, the state introduced thirty Kodak 
instant pictures proporting to show the minor nude, and some of 
which allegedly involve the simulating of sexual conduct. Many 
of the photographs were objected to (R. 131) by Defendant Jordan 
as not showing simulated sexual conduct, as charged. The Court 
took that objection under advisement, and never die rule on it. 
It appears, however, in the end, that all of the photographs were 
considered as evidence of the crime charged. 
The evidence at trial was uncontroverted in that there was 
no sexual activity involved between the minor and either of the 
Defendants (R. 137). While it may appear that there was "sirnu-
lated sexual conduct," that cannot be deterrr.ined because of the 
failure of the state to specify what simulated sexual conduct is. 
The .£..e..r..Q..e...r C o u r t , ( S up r a ) , s ta t ea " a s w i th a 11 1 e g i s 1 a t i on in 
this sensitive area, the conduct to be prohibited must be 
11 
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adequately defined by the applicable state law, •••• 31 cr.L. 
at 3144. The New York Statute defined the term "simulated," and 
the Supreme Court found that definition adequate. (See NY Penal 
Law [NcKinney] Section 263.00). Since we have not been told what 
constituted "simulated sexual conduct" and since it is impossible 
to tell from the record whether the nude photography or the 
photography of the alleged "simulated sexual conduct" was the 
conduct for which appellants were convicted, the conviction can-
not stand. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS DO HAVE THE STANDING TO RAISE FACIAL OVERBREADTH 
OF THIS STATUTE AS A DEFENSE TO PROSECUTION. 
Respondents further claim that appellants have no standing 
to attack the validity of section 76-10-1206.5 citing the general 
principle: 
••• that no one should be entitled to 
challenge the statute and have it declared 
void because it may unjustly affect someone 
else, but could properly do so only if his 
own rights are adversly affected. S.t.g_t~ y 
Phillips 540 P.2d 936 (Utah 1975). 
Respondents dismiss the case cited by Appellants in their 
original brief (Doran y Salem l.nn, 422 U.S. 930) as applying only 
to declaratory judgment actions. Respondents, in so doing, 
totally ignore the reasons for the adoption, by many 
jurisdictions, of declaratory judgment statutes. These statutes 
have been enacted in an effort to allow those who might be 
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charged with a crime to litigate the validity of a law without 
first having to be arrested and take the chance of going to jail. 
The adoption of these statutes, however, did not replace an 
arrested person's right to contest the validity of a law in a 
criminal proceeding. While respondents are correct in their 
citing of the general rule, there is a long line of cases (both 
criminal and noncriminal) indicating that this rule does not 
apply in first amendment cases. Since the ~~rbgr Court (in a 
criminal case) clearly upheld Appellants' contention that this is 
a First Amendment case, the rule which applies to First Amendment 
cases must be carefully examined. The Court state, in regard to 
the general principle: 
What has come to be known as the First 
Amendmendment overbreadth doctrine is one of 
the few exceptions to this general principle 
and must be justified by "weighty 
countervaling policies." (citations omit-
ted). The doctrine is predicated on the 
sensitive nature of protected expression: 
"persons whose expression is constitutionally 
protected may well ref rain from exercising 
their rights for fear of criminal sanctions 
by a statute susceptible of application to 
protected expression." (citations omitted). 
It is for this reason that we have alloweo 
persons to attack overly broad statutes even 
though the conduct of the person making the 
attack is clearly unprotected and could be 
proscribed by a law drawn with the requsite 
specificity. (citations omitted). 
The scope of the First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine, like most exceptions to established 
principles, must be carefully tied to the 
circumstances in which facial invalidation of 
a statute is truly warranted. Because of the 
wide-reaching effects of striking a statute 
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down on its face at the request of one whose 
conduct may be punished despite the First 
Amendment, we have recognized that the over-
br eadth doctrine is "strong medicine" and 
have employed it with hesitation, and then 
"only as a last resort." (citations omit-
ted). We have, in consequence, insisted that 
the overbreadth involved be "substantial" 
before the statute involved with be invali-
dated on its face. 31 Cr.L. at 3145. 
The United States Supreme Court, back in 1949, recognized 
that even a person whose activity may be constitutionally 
regulated may argue that the statute under which he is convicted 
or regulated is invalid on its face. The Court, in ~iniello y 
.c.i.t.y Q! ~~~.9.Q, 337 U.S. 1, was faced with an appeal by a man 
convicted of disorderly conduct for a speech given at a rally. 
The Court commented: 
Accordingly a function of free speech under 
our system of government is to invite dis-
pute. That is why freed om of speech, 
(citations omitted) is nevertheless protected 
against censorship or punishment, unless 
shown likely to produce a clear and present 
danger of a serious substantive evil that 
rises far beyond public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or unrest. 337 U.S. at 4. 
The ordinance as construed by the trial court 
seriously invaded this province. It permit-
ted conviction of petitioner if his speech 
stirred people to anger, invited public 
dispute, or brought about a condition of 
unrest. A conviction resting on any of those 
grounds may not stand. 
As we have s a id , the g 1 o s s w h i ch I 11 in o i s 
placed on the ordinance gives it a meaning 
and application which are conclusive on us. 
we need not consider whether as construed it 
is defective in its entirety. As construed 
and applied it at least contains parts that 
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are unconstitutional, the verdict was a 
general one; and we do not know on this 
record, but what it may rest on the invalid 
clauses. 337 U.S. at 5. 
As in the ~miniello case, even if only parts of the statute are 
invalid, it is impossible in this case to tell whether the 
conviction rested on the invalid clauses. 
In the 1960 case of the lln.ill.Q .5..t..9.~ Y. .E~~, 362 U.S. 17, 
the Court further elaborated on the First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine. The Court there said: 
For example, where, as a result of the very 
litigation in question, the constitutional 
rights of one not a party would be impaired, 
and where he has no effective way to preserve 
them himself, the Court may consider those 
rights as before it. 362 U.S. at 22. 
Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), the Court held: 
Given a case or controversy, a litigant whose 
own activities are unprotected may neverthe-
1 ess challenge a statute by showing that it 
substantially abridges the First Amendment 
rights of other parties not before the Court. 
444 U.S. at 634. 
Appellants in this case seek to exactly that. The reasons 
for the overbreadth doctrine were explained more fully in the 
case of U~IDQLQ~Jiki Y. £f.i..§~~~, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court 
there explained: 
A criminal prosecution under a statute regu-
1 at in g expression usually involves 
imponderables and contingencies that 
themselves may inhibit the full exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms. (citations omit-
ted). When the statutes also have an 
15 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
overbroad sweep, as is here alleged, the 
hazard of loss or substantial impairment of 
those precious rights may be critical. For 
in such cases, the statutes lend themselves 
too rea?ily to denial of those rights. The 
assumption that defense of a criminal prose-
cution will generally assure ample vindica-
tion of constitutionally rights is unfounded 
in such cases. (citations omitted}. Because 
of the sensitive nature of constitutionally 
protected expression, we have not required 
that all of those subject to overbroad 
regulations risk prosecution to test their 
rights. For free expression -- of transcen-
dent value to all society, and not merely to 
those exercising their rights -- might be the 
loser. (citations omitted). For example, we 
have consistently allowed attacks on overly 
broad statutes with no requirement that the 
person making the attack demonstrate that his 
own conduct could not be regulated by a 
statute drawn with the requisite narrow 
specificity. (citations omitted). We have 
fashioned this exception to the usual rules 
governing standing, (citations omitted) 
because of the ". • • danger of tolerating, 
in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the 
existence of a penal statute susceptible of 
sweeping and irr.proper application." (cita-
tions omitted}. If the rule were otherwise, 
the contours of regulation would have to be 
hammered out case by case -- and tested only 
by those hardy enough to risk criminal prose-
cution to determine the proper scope of regu-
lation. 380 U.S. at 486, 487. 
In the 1974 case of ~k~ y ~~, 417 U.S. 733, the Court 
reiterated that the same standards under the First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine apply in defense of criminal prosecution as 
in civil enforcement or actions involving a declaratory judgment. 
(See 417 U.S. 733 at 760.) The Court there repeated the prin-
cipal ear lier enuncia tea in the case of Broderick vs. Oklahoma, 
413 US 601 (1973) that: 
16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Where conduct and not merely speech is 
involved" the overbreadth must "not only be 
real, but substantial as well, judged in 
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate 
sweep." 417 US at 760; 413 us, at 615. 
The Ferber Court recognizes that the use of children to make 
sexually explicit materials for distribution is conduct as well 
as speech (see 31 CrL at 3146). The Court there simply finds 
that the New York Statute that prohibits commercial distribution 
of the specific material discussed in that case is not substant-
ially overbroad. In finding so, the Court makes the following 
observation: 
While the reach of the statute is directed at 
the hardcore of child pornography, the Court 
of Appeals was understandably concerned that 
some protected expression, ranging from medi-
cal text books to pictorials in National 
Geographic would fall prey to the statute. 
How often, if ever, it may be necessary to 
employ children to engage in conduct clearly 
within the reach of the section 263.15 in 
order to produce educational, medical or 
artistic works cannot be known with certain-
ty. x.eLlie ser iou~.Q.QJJ.Qt. and it has not 
been suagested that these arguably impermiss-
ible applications of the statute amount to 
more than a tiny fraction of the materials 
~i~hin_~~-~_t.a.ty~~~gh. (emphasis ad-
ded) (31 Cr.L. at 3146.) 
The Court's action, then, in upholding the New York Statute 
on its face and as applied to Paul Ferber is done very clearly 
because, while the statute may have sor.ie unconstitutional 
applications, those applications will never amount to more than 
"a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's reach." 
(supra). Because the statute at issue here is so broad as to 
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include a wide range of artistic, educational and scientific 
works, the same treatment cannot be given this statute as was 
given the New York Statute. Additionally, it should be noted 
that "the penalty to be imposed is relevant in determining 
whether demonstrable overbreadth is substantial." 31 Cr.L. at 
3146. The penalties set forth by section 76-10-1206.5 may be 
appropriate when "directed at the hardcore of child pornography" 
(supra). But they are not appropriate for the many kinds of 
conduct well short of "the hardcore of child pornography" pro-
scribed by the statute at issue here. In fact, the trial judge 
found the conduct of Appellants herein as not meriting the harsh 
treatment of the statute, and so granted motions by both Appel-
lants to sentence under the next lowest category of offense, 
which was as far as he could go in using his discretion to 
diminish the punishment. 
It should be noted here that the expression of the Court in 
E~I~I that the impermissible reach of the statute would only 
amount to "a tiny fraction" of the materials covered was followed 
by what amounts to a warning. The New York Statute, unlike 
Utah's, prohibits the use of children for "lewd exhibition of the 
genitals." The Court warned (at P. 3146): 
Nor will we assume that the New York courts 
will widen the possibly invalid reach of the 
statute by giving an expansive construction 
to the proscription on 'lewd exhibition[s] of 
the genitals. 
18 
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What the Court was warning New York not to do was precisely what 
Utah has done, and what it cannot do. 
CONCLUSION 
The Ferber court limited the question at issue to a determi-
nation of whether the legislature could protect "children who are 
made to engaged in sexual conduct for commercial purposes." 
Nobody in this case was made to do anything she had not volun-
teered to do, and no commercial purposes whatsoever were 
involved. While, then, the New York "child pornography" law was 
not substantially overbroad, the Utah Law, which is not a pornog-
raphy law at all but far more (R. 109) is indeed substantially 
overbroad and should be struck down by this Court so a proper one 
can be written. The Supreme Court in the.£~~ case has made it 
abundantly clear that a law can be written to protect minors from 
sexual abuse without abusing the rights of a large segment of the 
adult population. Utah has not done this, and should be instruc-
ted by this Court to get that job done. 
Respectfully submitted this ~r4f'-day of October, 1982. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & BARLOW 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
Attorney for Appellants 
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